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31 Aug 1980, DoDD 5200.10; AGO ltr, 29 Sep 1980	

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (13 Nov 68) FOR OT RD 683336

19 November 1968

SUBJECT: ~~Operational Report~~ Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Corps  
Artillery (Provisional) Vietnam ~~Report ending 31 July 1968 (U)~~

SEE DISTRIBUTION.

⑨ Operational Rpt. for quarterly period ending 31 Jul 68.

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

⑪ 25 Aug 68

⑫ 12/0.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

⑬ OACSFOR

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

⑭ OT-RD-683336

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, XXIV CORPS ARTILLERY  
APO 96308

AVII-ATC

25 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Corps Artillery (Provisional) Vietnam  
for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

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## 1. (C) Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities

### a. Organization:

(1) During the period 1 May to 31 July 1968, Corps Artillery (Provisional) Vietnam continued operational activities in progress. Major operations in the corps zone included Delaware Lam/Son/216 which terminated on 15 May 1968, KENTUCKY, LANCASTER II, SCOTLAND II, JEB STUART III, NEVADA EAGLE, RICE DENIAL and THOR. DRUMFIRE II and UNICORN were two small scale artillery raids involving Battery A, 2/94 Arty and A/1/83 Arty respectively. During the reporting period PCV Artillery participated in 92 days of tactical operations.

(2) Several significant changes in artillery units occurred during the reporting period. Battery C, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery OPCON to PCV and working as a part of 1st Bn, 83d Arty, was reassigned to the Americal Division on 14 June 1968. The following units were assigned or attached as indicated:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE-ASSIGNED/ATTACHED/OPCON</u>
108th Arty Gp	28 July 1968 - assigned to PCV Arty
8th Bn, 4th Arty (-) (175 SP)	
6th Bn, 33d Arty (-) (105 T)	
1st Bn, 40th Arty (105 SP)	
1st Bn, 44th Arty (40mm AT SP)	
2d Bn, 94th Arty (8"/175 SP)	
Btry F, 2d Bn, 26th Arty (TAB)	
Btry G, 65th Arty (.50 Cal HB MG)	
235th FA Radar Det	
238th FA Radar Det	
239th FA Radar Det	

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FOR OT R.D  
683336

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## UNIT

## DATE ASSIGNED/ATTACHED/OPCON

240th FA Radar Det	
245th FA Radar Det	
250th FA Radar Det	
2d Bn, 11th Arty. (-)	10 June 1968, Assigned to 101st ACD
1st Bn, 30th Arty	1 June 1968, Assigned to 1st ACD
1st Bn, 83d Arty (8"/175 SP)	1 June 1968, Assigned to PCV
Btry C, 6th Bn, 16th Arty	24 July 1968, ATCH to 101st ACD
Btry C, 6th Bn, 33d Arty	7 July 1968, ATCH to 101st ACD

b. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES. With the exception of Operation THOR, unit actions were primarily a continuation of offensive/defensive activities in assigned AO's. Major operations in progress at the end of the reporting period included KENTUCKY, LANCASTER II, SCOTLAND II, JEB STUART III and NEVADA EAGLE.

(1) Continuation of Operations in Progress: A minimum of two heavy artillery batteries, Battery C, 1st Bn, 83d Arty (8" SP) and Battery C, 8th Bn, 4th Arty (175 SP), remained at FSB Bastogne subsequent to the termination of Delaware Lam Son/216 on 17 May 1968. The 8" Battery continued to provide a precision destruction capability to support 101st Air Cavalry Division operations between Bastogne and the A Shau Valley. The 175mm battery fired upon targets of opportunity and enemy logistical installations and interdicted road nets throughout the A Shau Valley. A significant number of targets of opportunity were developed as a result of the emplacement of seismic sensory devices primarily in the A Shau Valley toward the end of Delaware Lam Son/216. Airborne aerial observers with readout devices linked to FSCE, PCV TOC, were utilized to assist in detecting targets.

(2) Operation UNICORN, 22 May 1968: PCV Artillery developed and executed Operation UNICORN as a result of intelligence received from reports of enemy activities in the Ta Trach Valley (YC845991), which is located within the 1st Marine Division Task Force X-Ray AO. Extensive aerial reconnaissance made of the area substantiated the presence of enemy installations and possible logistical supplies. Coordination was made with Task Force X-Ray to conduct an artillery raid utilizing Battery A, 1st Bn, 83d Artillery (PCV Arty) and the 1st 155 Gun Battery of the 1st FA Gp, 1st Marine Division. Both batteries supported the operation from firing positions located in Camp Hochmuth, Phu Bai. Aerial observers were employed during the two hour operation, however, no significant surveillance could be obtained due to visibility conditions.

(3) Operation DRUMFIRE II, 30 May to 1 June 1968: DRUMFIRE II was a two battery artillery raid executed by the 12th Marines in the CO ROC area of Laos (XD7432). Battery A, 2d Bn, 94th Arty (175mm SP) and four 8" howitzers from the 5th 155 Gun Btry and the 1st 8" How Battery were utilized to conduct the raid. The majority of the missions fired were unobserved. LZ's Stud (YD001484) and Hawk (XD896406) were used as position areas by the heavy batteries for the operation.

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(4) Operation THOR, 1-7 July 1968: Operation THOR was a 3-phased combined supporting arms attack on enemy artillery and forces in the Cap Mui Lay Sector (South Boundary DMZ-NS grid line 00-EW grid line 90-South China Sea).

(a) Operation THOR was conceived to accomplish two principal objectives:

(1) To destroy NVA Arty, field and coastal artillery in the Cap Mui Lay Sector of North Vietnam.

(2) To make possible continued surveillance and attacks on NVA installations in and north of the DMZ.

(b) The execution of Operation THOR required maximum concentration of heavy artillery assets in forward prepared positions to exploit their maximum range capability. The operation was an overwhelming success. Naval gunfire ships were able to come to within 5 km of the enemy shore without being fired upon and observer aircraft were able to operate deep within the operational area without losses. Friendly losses were 1 KIA, 1 MIA and 3 AF aircraft destroyed. In addition to achieving significant bomb/gun damage, aerial observers and photo reconnaissance elements located numerous artillery and AA/AV positions and other lucrative targets for post THOR exploitation. The task organization committed to the operation was as follows:

### Control Headquarters: FCV (Forward)

### Artillery Forces:

#### 108th Arty Group

2/94th Arty (175mm Gun) (SP)

8/4th Arty (-) (175mm Gun) (SP) Attached

1/83d Arty (8" How) (SP)

1st 8" How Btry (8" How) (PMF) Attached

4th Battalion, 12th Marines 155 How (SP)

Btry K, 4th Bn, 13th Marines (155 How) (SP) Attached

Btry F, 2d Bn, 26th Arty (TAB)

### Air Forces:

Strategic Air Command (USAF SAC B52)

7th Air Force (US AIR FORCE TAC AIR)

7th Fleet (US Navy TAC Air)

1st Marine Air Wing (USMC TAC AIR)

### Naval Forces:

TU 70.8.9

USS BOSTON (CAG-1) (6-8"/55, 10-5"/38)

USS ST PAUL (CA - 73) (9 - 8"/55, 10-5"/38)

USS TURNER JOY (DD-951) (3-5"/54)

USS HENRY B WILSON (DDG-7) (2-5"/54)

USS COCHRANE (DDG-21) (2-5"/38)

USS O'BRIEN (DD-725) (4-5"/38)

USS BOLD (DD-544) (6-5"/38)

USS BENNER (DD-807) (6-5"/38)



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(c) PCV Arty operated a forward command post during Operation THOR to coordinate attacks by fire on targets in North Vietnam. The command post used personnel from corps headquarters, corps artillery headquarters, 108th Arty Gp, and USAF and Navy Liaison Officers. Listed below is the organizational structure of the forward command post:

### COMMAND GROUP

CG, Corps Artillery (Provisional)  
Deputy Commander, Corps Arty  
Executive Officer, Corps Arty

#### Operations Group

Fire Support Coordinator

Air Attack Officer

Navy Attack Officer

Communications Personnel

Clerks

#### Briefing Group

Briefers

Statistical Officer

Clerks

Draftsman

#### Fire Planning Group

Chief, Fire Planning Group

Scheduling Officer, Arty

Scheduling Officer, Navy

Scheduling Officer, Air

G-3 Arclight

Plotters

Clerks

#### Targeting Group

Chief, Targeting Group

G-2 Arclight

Arty S-2

Air Observer Supervisor

Plotters

Clerks

All groups except the briefing group worked in two shifts. The attack officers in the operations group had communication with the artillery battalions, naval gunfire ships and an airborne tactical air command post. The targeting group received direct readout on air photo interpretations by radioteletype, SLAR results by FM radio, and aerial observer information by FM radio. Targets of opportunity were attacked by the most appropriate attack mechanism, and surveillance was sent to the targeting center for appropriate processing. The Fire Support Coordinator was responsible for regulating air space and assigning attack mechanisms. This small, fully integrated control group was successfully employed throughout the exercise.

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(d) A unique system for obtaining photo reconnaissance readouts was established during Operation THOR. A U.S. Marine air photo reconnaissance squadron took photographs of the target area, developed them, analyzed them, and sent the readout by dedicated teletype to the Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) approximately 100 miles away in 12 hours, or less.

### 2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

#### a. Personnel

ITM: Lesson Learned #1: Shortage of Metro Section Personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION: Shortages of qualified personnel exist in ballistic metro sections.

(b) EVALUATION: Some metro sections are short of qualified personnel. In some cases personnel with MOS 93E20 (Signal Metro Computer) are being assigned in lieu of authorized MOS 93F20 (Ballistic Metro Computer). The qualifications of these personnel are such that additional training is needed to adequately perform their jobs. Shortage of personnel in MOS 35D20 (Metro Equipment Operator) also creates problems. Each metro section is normally located too far away from a support maintenance facility. It is imperative that each section have qualified mechanics to repair the equipment in order to remain operational.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Every effort should be made to insure that qualified personnel are assigned to ballistic metro sections. If personnel in MOS 93E20 (Signal Metro Computer) are assigned to metro sections in lieu of the authorized MOS required, recommend that they be given approximately four weeks of cross training in MOS 93F20 duties prior to assignment to an operational section in-country.

#### b. Operations

(1) ITM: Lesson Learned #2: Common Target Numbering System for Joint Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: There is a need for a common target numbering system for joint operations.

(b) EVALUATION: During THOR, problems were initially encountered with the lack of common target numbering system between the US Air Force and the supporting surface forces. The Air Force maintains its target list in a computer bank whereas PCV maintains its list manually. The cross referencing of target numbers was a cumbersome task. Many PCV targets were not on the Air Force list making scheduling for air attack a difficult task. To overcome this problem a system was improvised. The number of an Air Force target with coordinates in the same grid square as the PCV target was used as a reference point. Pilots were then able to locate the PCV target by referring to the Air Force target.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: A common system of target designation and a joint targeting facility be established to eliminate the time interval lost in converting from one system to another, to avoid duplication, and to permit rapid input of emerging targets into the target designation system.

### (2). ITEM: Lesson Learned #3: Fire Support Coordination.

(a) OBSERVATION: In a combined supporting arms attack, strict fire control measures must be observed to preclude aircraft from being shot down by friendly artillery or naval gunfire. These measures must be flexible enough to permit attack of any emerging target by the most effective attack mechanism, however.

(b) EVALUATION: Prior to Operation THOR it became apparent that with the intense competition for the airspace over the THOR AO, fire control measures would have to be implemented. Three fire control measures were employed with excellent results. These were:

(1) Fire Control Zones (FCZ). The AO was divided into 7 zones lettered T to Z, which combined with a max ordinate for artillery and naval gunfire, provided horizontal as well as vertical separation of artillery trajectories and aircraft flight paths.

(2) Maximum ordinates for artillery and naval gunfire. During night time firing, artillery and naval gunfire were limited to 20,000 ft maximum ordinates.

(3) Radar bomb drops were limited to a minimum drop altitude of 22,000 ft. This, combined with artillery and naval gunfire max ordinates, provided a 2000 ft safety buffer for aircraft.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The fire support coordination techniques described in paragraph 2a, 2b above, worked extremely well. Time in transmitting maximum ordinates within the Fire Control Zones (FCZ) could have been reduced through a system of color codes. At the after-action THOR conference at ABCCC, Udorn, Thailand on 13 July 1968, it was agreed that colors should be used in future operations to indicate maximum ordinate zones, i.e., below 7,000 feet: red; between 7,000 and 14,000 feet: white; between 14,000 and 20,000 feet: blue; and over 20,000 feet: purple. This system would entail merely announcing the FCZ and a color, e.g., Tango Blue.

### (3) ITEM: Lesson Learned #4: Air Photographic Reconnaissance support.

(a) OBSERVATION: Photo reconnaissance mission readouts in support of raids by firepower must be timely for prompt engagement of targets.

(b) EVALUATION: During Operation THOR a direct radio teletype link was established between PIR and PCV (FJD) CP to expedite the transmission of photo readout data. The reconnaissance missions were programmed and integrated into the scenario. Results were available in 12 hours or less. In one case, the total time elapsed from the time the target was acquired to the time it was engaged was 8 hours.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: In future operations of this type, a communications system as described in paragraph (3)(b) above be adopted. Short of having the photo imagery interpretation team co-located with the FSCC, the next best solution is to have direct communication links to the team location. This system reduces reaction time in engaging targets, thus increasing the probability of destroying them.

c. Training:

ITEM: Lessons Learned #5: FDC Cross Training in 175mm units.

(a) OBSERVATION: Battery personnel in 175mm battalions should be fully qualified to fire 8" firecracker ammunition.

(b) EVALUATION: 175mm units occasionally retube one or more batteries to 8" as the operational situation requires. Prior to 8" selected munition being released to the unit for firing, unit personnel must be trained and certified. Prior cross training of FDC and firing battery personnel will reduce the required time to complete the necessary training and subsequent certification.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Cross training programs for 175mm gun battalions should include instruction on 8" selected munitions.

d. Intelligence. None

e. Logistics. None

f. Organization. None

g. Other. None

1 Incl

XXIV Corps Org Structure

*Frank W. Burpo*  
FRANK W. BURPO  
GCL, Arty  
Deputy Commander

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- 10 - XXIV Corps Arty S-3 file

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AVII-GCT (25 Aug 68) 1st Ind

MAJ Sanderson/jas/2506

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Corps Artillery (Provisional) Vietnam  
for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CS FOR-65 (R1)

DA, HQ, XXIV CORPS, APO 96308 21 September 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO 96375

1. The ORLL of Corps Artillery (Prov) Vietnam has been reviewed at HQ, XXIV Corps and is forwarded in accordance with USARV Reg 525-15.
2. Comments on Section 2: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Concur with commander's observations, evaluations and recommendations noted at para 2b-c without further comment.

b. Item: Shortage of metro section personnel, page 5, para 2a. Concur. The situation has improved since the report was written. However, the recommendation should be studied. Recommend HQ, CONARC review the programs of instruction for 93E and 93F MOS producing courses to insure that personnel completing these courses may be effectively cross assigned within comparable skill levels as indicated in AR611-201.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*HR Taylor*  
H. R. TAYLOR  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

Cy Furn:  
DA, ACSFOR  
CG, XXIV Corps Arty

AVHGC-DST (25 Aug 68) 2d Ind (U)

MAJ Klingman/ds/LGN 4433

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Corps Artillery (Provisional) Vietnam  
for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CS FOR-65 (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 16 OCT 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPDP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters, XXIV Corps Artillery.

2. Reference item concerning common target numbering system for joint operations, page 5, paragraph 2b: Concur. The required system has been developed by the US Army Artillery and Missile School. The procedures not only apply to artillery, tactical air, and naval gunfire targets, but are compatible with the TACFIRE computerized fire direction system under development for the post 1970 period.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
W. C. ARNTZ  
CPTAGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
HQ XXIV Corps  
HQ XXIV Corps Arty

GPOP-DT (25 Aug 68) 3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, Corps Artillery (Prov) Vietnam for  
Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 5 NOV 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-  
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C. L. SHORTT  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

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## PCV ARTY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE as of 31 July 1968

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STATUS</u>
HQ, 108th Arty Gp	Assigned to HQ, Corps Arty (Prov)
8/4th Arty	Assigned to 108th Arty Gp
6/33d Arty	Assigned to 108th Arty Gp
1/40th Arty	Assigned to 108th Arty Gp
1/44th Arty	Assigned to 108th Arty Gp
2/94th Arty	Assigned to 108th Arty Gp
F/26th Arty	Assigned to 108th Arty Gp
G/29th Arty	Atch to 1/44th Arty, OPCON III MAF
G/65th Arty	Atch to 1/44th Arty
235th FA Radar Det	Assigned to 108th Arty Gp
238th FA Radar Det	Assigned to 108th Arty Gp
239th FA Radar Det	Assigned to 108th Arty Gp
240th FA Radar Det	Assigned to 108th Arty Gp
245th FA Radar Det	Assigned to 108th Arty Gp
250th FA Radar Det	Assigned to 108th Arty Gp
1/83d Arty	Assigned to PCV Arty
C/6/16th Arty	Atch to 101st ACD
1st 8" How Btry (FMF)	OPCON to PCV Arty
5th 155 Gun Btry (FMF)	OPCON to PCV Arty

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